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AGENT.

In every case where a party who has engaged to perform certain
labor or services employs others to perform on his account, and such
others after commencing to perform, refuse to go on or to allow the
work to proceed, such refusal is the refusal of their employers; and if
it amounts to a violation of the contract, it is the breach of their
employer. Their misconduct in such a case is his misconduct, so far as
it operates upon the contract and occasions non-performance: Keeney v.
The Grand Trunk Railway Co., 59 Barb.
AGREEMENT.

Construction of-Where the object of a contract is to relieve a party
undertaking to perform a duty from some of the obligations and liabilities which the law imposes upon him in the absence of any express
stipulation, it is to be construed in reference to that object and purpose:
Keeney v. The Grand Trunk Railway Co., 59 Barb.
General expressions, exempting a party from liability on account of
injuries to property committed to his charge, should never be held to
apply to injuries arising from the wrongful acts of the party undertaking, unless it is expressly so stipulated: Id.
BILLS AND

NOTES.

Suit by Assignee-Representationsof Mak er.-The maker of a promissory note, not governed by the law merchant, made and delivered to
the payee, to enable him to negotiate the note, a separate writing, of
even date with the note, as follows:
,1Bearcreek Tp., Ind., July 28th 1865.

"This is to show that the note given by me this day to" A. B. "for
$75 is all right and will be paid when it comes due."
(Signed)
C.D.
The note was assigned before maturity to one who was induced to
purchase it by reason of said writing, which accompanied it. Held, in
a suit on the note by said assignee against the maker, that the latter
might impeach the note for want of consideration and fraud in obtaining it: Jaquav. Montgomery, 33 Ind.
IFrom James B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 33 Ind. Rep.
2 From W. C. 'Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 6 or 7 Kansas Rep.
3 From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 58 Maine Rep.
4 From H. K. Clarke, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 20 'ich.

Rep.

5 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 59 of his Reports.
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The assignee of a promissory note, not governed by the law merchant,
to whom it was assigned before maturity, after itbecame due agreed to
extend the time of payment for a definite period, and did so, upon the
promise of the maker that, if the assignor would so forbear, he would
pay it at the expiration of such period. .eld, that this promise of the
maker constituted a new contract, binding in law, and capable of
enforcement, though the maker had a good defence to the note before
its assignment by the payee : Id.
CARRIERS.

Liabilityfor Breach of Contract-The defendant, a common carrier,
received from the plaintiffs, at Goderich, in Canada, a number of cattle
upon its cars, under a special contract, by which it undertook to forward them to Buffalo, to the consignee, "subject to their tariff and conditions expressed." In these conditions itwas expressed that the owners
undertook all risk of loss, injury, damage or other contingencies, in
loading, unloading, conveyance and otherwise; and that the defendant
did not undertake to forward the animals by any particular train, or at
any specified hour, and was not responsible for the delivery thereof
within any certain time, or for any particular market. The cattle were
started the same day, and taken a part of the distance, and had the
cars containing them gone on, with the train, would have reached
Buffalo the same night. Instead of this, the cars, when within sixty
or seventy miles of that place, were by a positive and peremptory order
from the defendant's freight superintendent, detached from the train
and placed upon a side track where the cattle could neither be fed nor
watered, nor with any safety be unloaded, and were there detained three
or four days, and several of the animals'perished from hunger and the
inclemency of the weather, and others were greatly reduced in flesh,
weakened, and otherwise injured. Reld, 1. That according to the conditions expressed in the special contract, the defendant could not, in
this manner, and for this length of time, suspend the performance of
the undertaking it had thus commenced, without rendering itself liable
to the plaintiffs for the damages occasioned by such suspension. 2. That
the "conditions" did not extend to a case of damage arising from the
deliberate and intentional act of the defendant, or its agents, in suspending performance after it had been commenced, and refusing to perform, or to allow performance, until after the property, or a portion
thereof, had been destroyed. In other words, that the defendant did
not reserve to itself the right to perform, or not, as itmight afterwards
elect, or to perform only as itmight suit its interests, convenience, or
pleasure. 3. That this was not a case of an injury arising from negligence, in any degree, but a case of an injury arising from a deliberate
and intentional refusal to perform, for the time being, the undertaking
of the defendant. 4. That such refusal by the defendant's freight
agent, to perform the contract, was the act of the defendant, and the
defendant was liable for the consequences, so far as his act or order had
the effect to prevent performance, and thus create a breach of contract,
and this whether the agent was authorized to make the order or not:
Keen(7 v. The Grand Trunk Railway Co., 59 Barb.
A general carrier of freight has no right to discriminate, in forward-
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ing freight, between different owners, in favor of one class, to the prejudice of others, by deliberately stopping, or delaying, the property of
one person, in order to give a preference to that of another, contrary to
the ordinary course of business: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Title of Legislative Acts.-A law which provides for the expenditure
of certain highway taxes on two distinct state roads, and for the location and construction of a third state road, and for the expenditure of
certain other taxes upon that (No. 471, Laws of 1867, p. 964), is repugnant to Art. 4, § 20 of the Constitution, that "no law shall embrace
more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title :" People ex
rel. Estes v. Denahy, 20 Mich.
CONTRACT.

Construction of-Assignment-Effect of.-A railroad sub-contractor,
by his written agreement with the contractor, agreed "to construct and
complete all the grading, earth, rock, and masonry for the road-bed of
the Somerset Railroad, from the third station north of Otis Hill roadcrossing, to the Kennebec river ;" "that if any work shall be done by
said sub-contractor which is not included in this contract, the price and
value of said work shall be determined by the chief engineer ;" "that
the said work, during its progress, shall be subject to the supervision
and inspection of said engineer, and shall be made to conform, in every
respect, to his satisfaction ;" "that with a view of preventing all disputes and misunderstandings, and for the speedy adjustment of such as
may occur, the chief engineer shall determine the amount or quantity
of the several kinds of work herein contracted to be done, and shall
decide every question which can or may arise relating to the execution
of work under this contract, on the part of the sub-contractor, and his
decision shall be final." The sub-contractor did work on the foundation
of the bridge across the Kennebec river, which was accepted and its
value estimated by the chief engineer. Held, that the work on the
bridge foundation was done under the contract: Rogers v. hogan, 58
Me.
And an assignment of such a contract by the sub-contractor, and "'all
the rights and privileges therein mentioned," except the 10 per cent.
due "on all earth, excavations of earth, and masonry and stone delivered
on the road to the 1st of March," carries the value of the work on the
foundation of the bridge as estimated by the chief engineer : 17.
Illegal Contract-Recoveringback Xoney paid under.-If the parties
to an illegal contract are not in pari delicto, the party which has been
taken advantage of by the one receiving the money, may recover it back
in an action for money had and received: Inhabitants of Concord v.
Delaney, 58 Me.
The plaintiff town, at a legal meeting called for the purpose, "voted
to raise six hundred and twenty-five dollars to each man who enlists to
fill Concord's quota on the last call," and that " the selectmen hire
money and pay the volunteers after they are mustered into the United
States service." Thereupon the selectmen hired the money and paid
fifty-four hundred dollars to the defendants, who fraudulently assured
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them that pursuant to their contract with the selectmen, the defendants
had caused to be enlisted, accepted, and placed to the quota of the
plaintiff town nine men for three years each, when in fact eight of the
men were enlisted and credited for one year only. In an action for
money had and received to recover back the money paid, Reld, that the
action is maintainable, without first placing the defendants in statu quo:
Id.
DAMAGES.
Measure of- Con verson.-Where one forcibly took possession of certain wheat as it stood in the *field, driving the owner away, and harvested
and sold it: Reid, in an action for such taking and conversion, that
the value of the wheat at the time of its sale, in the form in which it
was sold, was the measure of damages, if the plaintiff was content therewith, though he was entitled to the highest price of the property at any
time between the taking and the sale; and the defendant was not
entitled to prove the value of his own labor in harvesting and threshing
the crop, for the purpose of reducing the damages: Ellis v. Wire, 33
Ind.
DEED.
Reformitng Deeds in Equity-Parol Evidence to establish Trusts.Deeds of conveyance, leases, or other written evidences of title, will not
be changed by proof of a verbal agreement, except in very clear cases,
and where the contract is proved to the entire satisfaction (f the court:
Case v. Peters, 20 Mich.
FRiAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Interest in Land.-The right to use, for the purpose of worship, a
church edifice when not occupied by the church to which it belongs, is
an interest in real estate, and a contract therefor, to be valid, must
be in writing, signed by the party to be charged : Brumfield v. Carson,
33 Ind.
HIGHWAY.

Neighborhood Road.-A neighborhood road is not a private road,
and the question whether the right of eminent domain may be exercised
to take land for a private road is not applicable to it: Kissninger v. Hanselman, 33 Ind.
The record of the board of county commissioners in a proceeding to
locate a highway need not contain the evidence by which it was proved
that the proper notice had been given of the intention to present the
petition for the highway ;-it is enough if the record shows that the
fact was proved, without showing how it was proved: Id.
H1OMESTEAD.

ipeciflc Performance-Contractto convey a Homestead.-A deed by
a husband, not signed by his wife, of premises occupied by them as a
homestead, is not merely voidable, having a contingent operation as to
the homestead; it is wholly invalid. And a contract by the husband
to make such a conveyance, intended to have a direct and present operation, will not be specifically enforced: Phillips v. Stauch, 20 Mich.
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Can pensation in lieu of Specific Performance.-In a case where the
value of the property, which includes a homestead, and which the husband contracted to convey, exceeds the maximum allowed as a homestead, and the premises are also subject to the contingent dower of the
wife; the adjustment of compensation, together with a decree for a
partial performance, would be so difficult, that it ought not to be
attempted: Id.
INSURANCE.

Mutual Company -Receiver-Pleading.-In a suit by a receiver of a
mutual fire insurance company, organized under the laws of this state,
to recover an assessment on a premium note executed to said company
by the defendant, it is not necessary that the complaint should be
accompanied by a transcript of the decree appointing the plaintiff
receiver of the company and making the assessment sued for: Boland
v. Whitman, 33 Ind.
By agreement between a mutual fire insurance company, acting
through its board of directors or an agent duly authorized by them, and
the insured, a contract of insurance may be rescinded by the surrender
of the policy before the expiration of the time for which it was issued
and the release of the insured from further obligation on his premium
note : Id.
The fact that assessments upon a premium note executed to a mutual
fire insurance company have been made more frequently and in greater
amounts than the agent of the company, at the time of the execution
of the note, represented they would be to the insured, who confided in
such representations and was induced thereby to enter into the contract
and execute the note, cannot constitute a defence to a suit on such note:
Id.
Fraudulent Representations as to Solvency.-If at the time of the
making of the contract of insurance, the agent, by the authority of the
directors, represents that the company is entirely solvent and able to
pay all losses and is then worth a certain considerable amount, and the
insured relies on such representations and is induced thereby to enter
into said contract and execute the premium note, and said representations are false, these facts will constitute a good defence to a suit on
said premium note: Id.
Pleading-Fraud.--Suitby the receiver of a mutual fire insurance
company on a premium note. Answer, that the officers of said company entered into a fraudulent combination with A. and B. and procured
the institution by A. and B. of the suit against said company, in which
said receiver was appointed and the assessment sued for in this action
was made, and by fraud, collusion, improper admissions, and false testimony, procured the decree, assessment, and appointment of the plaintiff
in this action as receiver. Hel'd, that if the defendant could in this
collateral manner impeach said decree for fraud, still the answer was
bad for failing to allege any material facts constituting fraud: Id.
Change of Ownership of Insured Property.-Where property insured
by a mutual fire insurance company is sold and conveyed by the insured,
he is not liable to be assessed on his premium note for losses occurring
after such sale and conveyance: Id.
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See Trustee.
Remedy-Act of 1867.-Wheie a promissory note containing a stipulation for interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum was execited
before the interest law of 1867, authorizing such contracts, was enacted,
and suit was brought thereon after that law took effect, elid, that the
contract as to interest was governed by said law: Pattison v. Jenkins,
33 Ind.
INTEREST.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Lease at Lessee's Option-Election.-Aparty in possession of premises
under a lease granted "for the term of one year, with the privilege of
having the same three years at the same rate" at his option,-the lease
containing a covenant that he would "at the end of said term deliver
up quiet possession of the premises," and who continues in possession
after the end of the first year, elects, by such continuance, to hold the
premises for the full term of three years: Delashman v. Berry, 20 Mich.
PARTNERSHIP.

rndividualand PartnersipDebts-Mortgage.-Certain real estate
being owned by a firm composed of two partners and used in the business
of the partnership, one of them alone executed a mortgage on an undivided half of it, to secure the payment of his individual debt. Afterwards said real estate was sold at sheriff's sale under a judgment rendered,
after the execution of said mortgage, against the partners, for a debt of
the firm contracted before the execution of the mortgage. Held, that
the mortgagee was not entitled to foreclose his mortgage as against the
purchaser at the sheriff's sale, without first redeeming or offering to redeem from the sheriff's sale that part of the real estate covered by said
mortgage : Kistner v. Sindlinger, 33 Ind.
Suit between Partners- Code.-Under the code, a partner can sue
his copartner, not to recover the plaintiff's share of the partnership
property or assets before the partnership business has been adjusted,
but to obtain an adjustment of the partnership affairs and thus recover
his entire interest therein. The case made must.be such as would formerly have called for the interposition of a court of equity: Page v.
Thompson, 33 Ind.
Three persons were the owners of equal shares of a steamboat, which
they ran on joint account as partners. Suit in the usual form as upon
an assumpsit by one of them against another to recover one-third of the
amount which the latter owed the firm for liquors bought by him at the
bar of the boat (the third partner being made a defendant to answer as
to his interest). The partnership business had ceased, but there had
been no settlement thereof, the firm being still indebted, and having
uncollected claims due to it, and no balance having been agreed upon
as due from one partner to the oth~rs or either of them, and no special
romise having been made by the defendant to pay the plaintiff anything.
Held, that the suit would not lie : Id.
PLEADING.

See Vendor and Purchaser.

In Abatement.-A plea in abatement must be direct and positive,
and not argumentative: Severj v. ANye, 58 MIe.
Thus, in an action against a sheriff for the wrongful official acts of
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his deputy, a plea in abatement alleging substantially that the alleged
trespass accrued to the plaintiff by reason of the official acts of the defendant's deputy, for which the defendant was legally responsible; that
the plaintiff had his election to bring his action therefor directly against
the deputy or the defendant; that he elected to and did bring it against
the deputy, and the same is still pending and undetermined; and "that
by bringing his said suit directly against said deputy, the plaintiff
elected to release and did thereby release this defendant from all further liability for the supposed trespasses," etc., is bad : (Il.
The pendency of an action of trespass against a deputy-sheriff for
his wrongful acts done under color of his office, cannot be pleaded in
abatement in an action against the sheriff for the same cause : 11.
The pendency of such a suit against a deputy when an action
against the sheriff for the same cause is entered, is not a release of the
latter action : Id.
RAILROAD.

Negligence-Setting Fire to Grass alongside the Road.-When the
facts are agreed, what constitutes negligence is a question of law, and
this court can determine what is shown in the facts as readily and as
fully as the District Court: Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Butts, 6 or
7 Kans.
When a railway company is authorized to operate its line with locomotives propelled by steam, generated by fire, and uses a locomotive
provided with all the most approved applicances in use for preventing
injuries, by the escape and communication of fire therefrom, in good
order, and operated by competent and careful servants of the company,
and owing to a high wind, fire escapes, and spreading, burns the property of another, this is not negligence on the part of the company : Id.
It is not negligence,Ter se to permit standing grass and weeds to
remain on a railway track: Icd.
REAL ESTATE.

Damages-Action by Owner not in Possession.-An owner of real
estate is not without a remedy for injuries done to or upon the same,
simply because he is not at the time in possession of the same: Fitzpatrick v. Gebhart, 6 or 7 Kans.
Under chapter 113, of the General Statutes (page 1095), the owner
of real estate may recover the damages therein provided for, whether he
be in possession of the real estate or not; and he may recover, notwithstanding the party committing the injuries may be in possession of the
property as tenant of the owner, provided he commits the injuries without any color of authority: Id.
RECEIPT.

Construction of-Certficate-Constructionof.-A writing acknowledging that the subscriber had received the promissory note of another
"for five shares of stock in the M. T. Co., and certificates of stock are
to issue to" the maker of the note for the same, when ready for issue,is not a contract for the future sale of the shares, but a recognition that
the shares themselves were the consideration of the note: Hope Iron
Works v. Holen, 58 Me.
A certificate that a certain person named "is the owner of five-fortieth
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parts of the letters-patent and property of the M. T. Co.," . . . and
stipulating "that whenever an incorporated company shall be organized
: * . the holder hereof shall be entitled to receive its equivalent value
in the certificate of shares in the capital stock of such company," does
not operate as an assignment to the holder of any interest in the letterspatent: Id.
REPLEVIN.
Demand before Suit.-The rule of this Court in Trudo v. Anderson,
10 Mich. 357,-that where one's property has been disposed of without
authority by the, person having it in charge, the owner may bring replevin therefor without previous demand, approved : Ballou v. O'Bren,
20 Mich.
SALE.
Misrepresentationas to Quantity.-A. exhibited to B. a Schedule, as a
representation of the quantity of certain personal property, which the
former proposed to sell to the latter, who before purchasing, visited the
place where the property was situated, for the purpose of examining the
property and satisfying himself concerning it, and having examined it
as to quantity, or having had a full opportunity to do so, relying on his
own judgment, proposed other terms than those proposed by A., by
offering a sum in gross for an entire amount of property, including that
named in said schedule and other articles situated at the same place,
and A: accepted the offer, and the sale was made on the terms so proposed by B. Hed, in a suit on a note given in part payment, that the
maker could not set up as a failure of consideration, that the property
name in said schedule was of less quantity than therein represented;
and that the buyer could not claim that the seller had deceived him as
to the quantity of the property named in the schedule: Pattison v. Jenkins, 33 Ind.
Where a full opportunity is afforded to a purchaser for examining
property, which he is about to purchase, and which by the exercise of
ordinary diligence and prudence he could examine as to its quantity, the
question of the quantity being made to depend merely on the judgment,
and he fails to exercise such diligence and prudence, he cannot after the
sale complain that he has been deceived as to the quantity, or claim a
deduction from the price on account of the quantity: Id.
SHERIFF. See Pleading.
.Miscondut-Amercement after his Term of Ofice.-A sheriff may,
after his term of office has expired, be amerced for official misconduct,
whenever a proper case is made therefor: Armstrongq v. Grant, 6 or 7
Kans.
A sheriff who receives a writ of execution about thirty days before
his term of office expires, but does not serve the writ, nor return it to
the court from which it was issued, nor deliver the same to his successor
in office, cannot be amerced under the statute, unless it is affirmatively
shown, by special circumstances, that he was negligent, in failing or
refusing to commence to execute the writ before his term of office
expired: Id.
Discharge of Liability.-After the liability of a sheriff had become
fixed, by the neglect of his deputy to levy, collect or return an exeu-
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tion within its lifetime, the defendant applied to the plaintiff and obtained
his written consent, to be exhibited to the deputy, stating that he would
not proceed against the plaintiff until the maturity of certain notes
which the defendant proposed to leave with the deputy to satisfy the
execution. Beld, that such consent did not, per se, operate to discharge
the liability of the sheriff: MlcKinley v. Tucker, Sherif.f &-c., 59 Barb.
The plaintiff in the execution having expressly refused to take the
notes, himself, or to do any act to impair his remedy against the sheriff
it was further held, that his written consent to postpone proceedings
against the sheriff until the maturity of the notes did not operate as a
ratification of the prior neglect of the deputy which created the
liability: Id.
Otherwise, it seems, if the plaintiff, after a valid levy, had consented
to the arrangement, and to a postponement of the sale of the defendant's
property in the meantime: Id.
STATUTE.

Operate prosectvely-Title.-A law will be construed to have a
prospective operation only, unless the intent of the Legislature to the
contrary plainly appears. In cases of doubt the title of the act may be
resorted to in aid of its interpretation : Smith v. Eumphrey, 20 Mich.
TRUSTEE.

Administrator- When Chargeable with Interest.-An administrator
delayed some ten years in settling the estate, using the money of the
trust in his own private speculations, and upon a reference of his accounts
to a master, it did not appear that there was any reason for any unusual
delay in the settlement, and the administrator refused to account to the
master for the result of said speculations. The master in making his
report charged interest, after the first year from the granting of administration, 6n balances in the hands of the administrator: Held,
that there was no error of which the administrator could avail
himself, though the master should have charged compound interest,
making annual rests in the accounts for that purpose : Johnson's Administrators v. Hedrick, 33 Ind.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Forfeiture-Notice.-A contract for the sale and conveyance of real
estate contained a stipulation, that a non-compliance with the terms of
the contract, or any of them, by the vendee should work a forfeiture
of all right under the contract at the option of the vendor, but upon
previous notice, of a specified period, to the vendee, demanding a fulfilment and specifying such features as it should be deemed had not been
complied with: Held, in an action by the vendee, who had partly performed the contract on his part, against the vendor for wrongfully
declaring a forfeiture and thereby putting it out of the power of the
vendee to further carry out the contract accordiig to its terms, that
the stipulation for said notice was for the benefit of the vendee, and a
strict compliance with it by the vendor was necessary before declaring a
forfeiture: Case v. ll olcott, 33 Ind.
feld, also, that where the vendor, after giving to the vendee a notice
not in strict compliance with said stipulation, and while the contract
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was therefore in full force, by declaring a forfeiture put it out of the
power of the vendee to carry out his part of the contract, the vendee
was not required to perform or offer to perform, but might have his
action for being so prevented: Id.
Measure of Damages.-Where after part performance of a contract
for the conveyance of real estate, by the vendee, the improvements made
by him being contemplated by the contract, the vendor by his own wrongful act puts it out of the power of the vendee to fully comply with the
provisions of the contract, the measure of damages in an action by the
vendee against the vendor, for such breach, is the difference between
the unpaid purchase-money and the actual value of the lands at the
time of the breach: -Id.
Fraud-Pleading.-Acomplaint for damages for fraudulent representations by the vendor in the sale of land must contain an averment
that the plaintiff relied upon the representations. The want of such
averment cannot be supplied by a recital of evidence which might justify a presumption that the representations were relied upon, unless such
evidence be conclusive of the fact: Goings v. White, 33 Ind.
VESSEL.
Lien on Vesses- Writ for enforeing.-The writ for enforcing a laborer's lien on a vessel, under Public Laws of 1858, c. 15 (R. S., a. 91,
§ 7), need not allege whether the labor was done before or after she was
launched A:cabe,in rem, v. McRae and S/hip Empire, 58 Me.
The lien attaches, notwithstanding the labor was performed for one
who contracted with the owner: Id.
If the claimant would avoid the lien, he must show that the laborer
has knowingly surrendered or waived it: d.
A person claiming a lien, for labor on a vessel, is required to state in
his specification, the name of the owner only when he knows it: Id.
It is no defence: to an action for enforcing a lien on a vessel after she
is launched, that the officer making the attachment took a receiptor : .7d.
Where, in an action to enforce a lien upon a vessel, brought by a
laborer against one who contracted with the owner, the defendant is
defaulted, such default is not evidence against the claimant as to the
amount of the lien on the vessel: Id.
The question, "For how much of the amount due from the defendant, the laborer has a lien on the vessel attached," is, under R. S., e. 91,
§ 16, at the request of either party, to be determined by a jury; and
if a jury-trial be waived, this question shall be decided by the court, on
a hearing or report of an auditor appointed by the court: Id.
WARRANTY.

Parties-Hers.-Wherea covenant against incumbrances contained
in a deed of conveyance of real estate is broken, and the damages for
the breach accrue during the lifetime of the person holding under such
covenant, his heir has no right of action on the covenant. In such case
the administrator must sue: Frink v. Be/ls, 33 Ind.

